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Abstract 
I propose a study on Aristotle’s philosophy of animal mind by facing the perspective that the Stagyrite denied thought and reason 
to non-human animals due to their failure to speak. I will discuss basic concepts of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind to conclude 
that Aristotle’s position is open to a concept of animal mind with three main features. 
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1. The problem 
As a historian of philosophy I am fully aware that the subject of this panel, the applied philosophy, are important 
in contemporary philosophical debates and that there are connections with many others like animal ethics, animal 
rights, hierarchy of animals and other issues of this kind.  
But again as a historian of philosophy I am aware of the different perspectives one can encounter when it comes 
to establishing the historical foundations of such debates. In philosophy of mind it is quite common to say that the 
Aristotelian mind philosophy claim that animals do not have a mind or reason in the sense of capacity to think or 
calculate, because they lack what Aristotle called a logos. Since Aristotle defined humans as rational animals, it 
seems natural to conclude, as it was for the Stagyrite himself, that non-humans do not possess reason. But how we 
understand that concept of reason and how it is connected to the modern concept of mind is a question not so often 
posed. 
In his Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Minds, Robert Lurz (2009, 1-5) favors the perspective that 
Aristotle refused reason to animals, considering that the absence of speech („failure” as Lurz prefers to say) stated 
by Aristotle is the main ingredient of the problem. Although the presentation begins with the remark that „the minds 
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of animals has been an abiding topic in philosophy since its earliest beginnings”, the notion of mind is afterwards 
used in a narrower sense that only legitimates references to reason and speech. When it comes to emotions and 
memory, it is hard to tell whether these are referred to by the term mind or not.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Lurz proposes readers to accept that philosophy of animal minds should 
be regarded as a field in its own right. This is exactly the rationale for taking into discussion the starting point of this 
proposal, since there is a new discipline at stake. Is the founding of this supposed new field of enquiry dependant of 
exact and accurate narrative about past opinions and doctrines or is it not, that is a rhetorical question. Aristotle is 
very often made responsible for our own views of the past rather than his. In this way, animals are excluded from a 
philosophy of mind analysis. Several arguments are being used to support this position, like for instance Aristotle’s 
theory in Politics, that bees or other social animals cannot plan their social life, cannot be taught and therefore have 
no logos. For this reason I will face Lurz’s claims on Aristotle’s philosophy of animal mind to a more accurate 
investigation in order to critically contribute to a sensitive perspective.  
As counterpart, historians of philosophy that go back to the ancient commentators, insist on the fact that, 
according to Aristotle, beasts have sensory perception, desires, memory, imagination, and even emotions, which 
make them serious candidates to the status of beings that bear a mind (Sorabji: 1995). Naturally, the discussion 
opens towards what we understand by mind: in a broader sense mind is similar to what Aristotle would call soul or 
psyche but, in a narrower sense, mind means faculty of thinking only. The difficulty arises also from the modern 
notion of body, as we shall see. 
These two extreme notions of mind bear between a mind reduced to reasoning, on one hand, and mind as a whole 
that includes perception, desire, imagination, memory, emotions (and, of course, reason only for humans), on the 
other hand. Thus, historians of philosophy study the concept of mind in Aristotle by using contextual methods that 
favor reconstruction of ideas as they can be traced in Aristotelian texts, whereas analytic philosophers, the main 
developers of philosophy of animal mind, prefer to offer rather oversimplified perspectives of what they regard as 
simple historical curiosity. Is it possible to bridge the gap between the two perceptions? Or, in other words: does the 
lack of thinking or logos entail the absolute denial of an animal mind, even in a modern sense? I am thinking here 
that modern notions of mind like those of John Locke for instance have a very large meaning and include a wide 
array of activities starting from sensation, representation and feelings and going to reasoning and abstracting. We are 
going to observe how the notion of mind in Aristotle is developed and try to argue that there is an Aristotelian 
complex notion totally compatible with a concept of animal mind. 
2. Soul or mind? 
To start with, there is the canonical assertion at the beginning of On the Soul II.1, that soul is form for the 
substance called living thing, which is therefore alive and actual for that very reason. The kind of form soul is 
becomes clearer at 412a 11, a 22-27, 417a 20-30 when, by means of examples, Aristotle distinguishes between two 
kinds of actuality. Soul will mean something similar to “having a grammatical knowledge” therefore neither a 
substance per se, nor an act understood as factual action. Any natural body that can be predicated as potentially 
alive and capable of exercising consequent function of a living thing is rightly thought of as alive. Soul is then 
exactly a capacity to do an entire set of things specific to living beings.  
What we would call a subject is actually a substantial compound of form and matter, a distinction very different 
from the classical separation body-soul. The soul is the form of a body having life in potency, therefore the potency 
of a specific kind of living body. This means that certain bodies, the inanimate ones, must have some different kind 
of form that could not be called a soul (Polanski: 2007, 166-167).  
The first two chapters of On the Soul II list these activities of animate substances for which souls are exclusively 
responsible: self-nourishment, growth, decay, movement and rest (in respect of place), perception, intellect. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics there is a similar passage as well which we are going to illustrate. 
“Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the 
horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a 
principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought. And, as ‘life of the rational 
element’ also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean…” (Nicomachean Ethics, I, 7, in Barnes, 1991) 
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What Aristotle says is this fragment is that he favors the notion of active life (of whatever complexity), and, 
among the forms of active life, the more complex. Nutrition and growth are the simplest and, though active, they are 
obviously surpassed by perception and reason. These activities are hierarchically organized into three degrees of 
complexity (On the Soul, 413 a): a) soul of plants (called nutritive and capable of reproduction, growth, nutrition); 
b) animal soul (called sensitive and capable of self-locomotion and perception); and c) human soul, called 
intellection or thinking, capable of understanding and reasoning.  
Thus, plants have the simplest soul activity but nonetheless a soul in its full meaning as internal principle of 
movement. Starting from this, it is often said that Aristotle has organized living realms in a hierarchic way. But it is 
in fact the distinction between active and passive that guides us through the entire theory. Mind is, for Aristotle, 
something that makes sense to the extent that it is either active or passive, this being the key to the problem. To this 
extent, animals have potential capacities for acting in many ways like humans. As principal function of the souls, or 
rather, as a middle term between animate and inanimate, intrinsic movement is equivalent to life and the specific 
difference of the soul. But how is this notion of soul connected with understanding and intellectual activity in 
general? 
3. Perception, memory and imagination as mind 
With this issue we step into Aristotelian epistemology to deal with the question: “How understanding is formed?” 
The understanding subject is in itself a substantial entity that encounters another substantial entity, the object of 
knowledge. While perceiving it, the subject suffers an “alteration” (alloiosis) of both perceptive soul, whatever that 
is, and perceiving organs, that is, body (see Barnes, 1972: 108 and On the Soul, 410a25, 415b24; 416b33-35 and 
especially 422a7; b15; 423b30; 435a22). Suffering alterations the perceiving soul-body becomes like what it comes 
to perceive, an expression equivalent to “receiving the form without the matter” (On the Soul., 424a18; 425b23; 
434a29).  
The act of perception can be described as a relation between a subject and an object, which are still different from 
the modern representation since the object is not entirely passive and the subject not totally active; Aristotle does not 
speak about “subject” and “object” nevertheless. What we would call a perceptive subject is a compound of form 
and matter. We understand that perception as taking the form of the observed object means assuming something of 
that external substantial form into the form of perceiving subject. Each of these entities have form and matter in their 
own right, let us name F1 and F2 the forms of each and M1 respectively M2 the matter proper to each substantial 
being or perceived object. Thus, the cognitive soul of the observer, name it F1, gets enriched after the process of 
observation by taking something from the form of the object perceived, name that F2. 
Before the cognitive process we have a potential observer that is a substantial compound of the structure F1/M1 
and a potential observed object like F2/M2. Now, as the perception occurs, the potential observer becomes an actual 
observer and its soul is modified like this: (F1+F2/XF1)/(M1/XM1), where XF1 is the extent to which F2 adds to F1, 
and XM1 the extent to which M1 actualizes to be the perceiving act. This is in accordance with Aristotle’s claim that 
the soul (memory and imagination) become what they know and that  
“It was a good idea to call the soul ‘the place of forms’, though this description holds only of the thinking soul, and even this is the forms only 
potentially, not actually” (On the Soul, 429a27-28, in Barnes, 1991) 
In other words, the difference between plant and animal soul is the following: animals are capable of taking or 
assuming the form of the external object (F2) and make it a property or part of their own form by means of 
perception, whereas plants cannot do that, as they are not affected by the external sensible form solely. Plants can 
only be affected by the entire substantial compound (F2 and M2), which means they are only able of mechanical 
interaction.  
This explanation may lead us towards a relevant conclusion. What is perception and why perception is mind, can 
be answered exactly on the basis that plants are only affected by the common action of matter and form (here M2 
and F2) of the object they interact with, while animal perception is able to receive the separate sensible form (F2 
only) and assume it as a part or feature of their own form (F1), thus the cognitive soul of an animal will become a 
richer form (F1 + F2).  
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The bigger inter-regnum gap is therefore not the one between animal and human realm as we may think but, on 
the contrary, it is between plants and the rest of living beings. The soul as a whole, including memory and 
imagination, has this capacity of becoming what we know.  
Another step is taken when Aristotle speaks about the impact of body on the process of knowledge and suggests 
that not only representation mingles with the perceived objects but there is a bodily involvement as well. The 
particular body structure of a knowing subject is also part of the subject’s knowledge as it influences at least the 
quality of memory or imagination. In the On Memory and Reminiscence we find that 
“Those whose upper parts are abnormally large, as. is the case with dwarfs, have abnormally weak memory, as compared with their opposites, 
because of the great weight which they have resting upon the organ of perception, and because their mnemonic movements are, from the very 
first, not able to keep true to a course, but are dispersed, and because, in the effort at recollection, these movements do not easily find a direct 
onward path. Infants and very old persons have bad memories, owing to the amount of movement going on within them; for the latter are in 
process of rapid decay, the former in process of vigorous growth; and we may add that children, until considerably advanced in years, are dwarf-
like in their bodily structure. Such then is our theory as regards memory and remembering their nature, and the particular organ of the soul by 
which animals remember; also as regards recollection, its formal definition, and the manner and causes-of its performance” (453a-b, , in Barnes, 
1991). 
Memory functions like a recipient of external forms after perception acted as fetcher. I take memory or 
imagination as similar terms since they are translations of the same Greek term, phantasia, explaining many mental 
activities like: visualizing, dreams, memory, expectation, thought, reasoning, desires, deliberation, passions, speech, 
and action (see Caston, 1996: 21 n. 3; 41 n. 46). 
Mind therefore depends on subject’s own body properties (in terms of sensible forms), being body dependant and 
therefore unique to each individual and having its acuity strongly affected by these body peculiarities. Aristotle’s 
theory is saying no less than that at the level of memory and imagination mind is rather a common function of body 
and soul than something separate. It is almost possible to say that, to some extent, the body imagines and 
memorizes.  
4. Intellect as mind in general 
It is not only the memory and imagination but intellect as well that becomes identical with its object of 
knowledge: passive intellect (pathetikos nous) becomes all things. It is inseparable from the body, therefore a body 
property rather than a thing in itself. It can “become all things”, it is passive and especially perishable (On the Soul., 
430a10, 15, 25), for the very reason that it becomes something else. It could not last because there is nothing to last, 
since it is acting as something else all the time: the nous pathetikos is only the pure possibility of different forms for 
actualizing. 
One of the most intriguing developments one modern mind may encounter here is the inseparability of passive 
intellect. The mind as capacity is inseparable and this very notion of inseparable soul is of most interest for us too. 
On the other hand, non-material intellect (poietikos) is essentially activity therefore creative, separable, unaffected 
and unmixed (On the Soul, 430a18). Just like the nous for Anaxagoras, whom Aristotle praises for this, only the 
active intellect or the principle is separable. 
The notorious On the Soul III.5, distinguishing between the “matter” and form of thinking, served for many 
historians and contemporary philosophers as well (Barnes, 1972) as a basis for asserting an Aristotelian exclusivist 
position that considers humans as having some sort of separate faculty identified with what we would call a mind. 
Active intellect is actually one of the most controversial aspects of Aristotelian psychology and, according to recent 
critical endeavors; it is not even a faculty distinct from the passive intellect, since it cannot be sustained as 
Aristotle’s clear intention. It is the analogy to light in On the Soul III.5 that created so many difficulties along the 
European philosophical historiography from Aquinas ever since. 
“Comparing the Intellectus Agens with a perfect light makes it difficult to explain how this divine power can dwell in the human soul (it looks a 
lot like the ghost in the machine). Finally, the participatio luminis a substantiis separatii is an expression which lacks explanatory power” (Zagal, 
2005) 
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The problem of active intellect is more complex. First, humans do not, so to say, have it. What Aristotle calls 
active intellect is not a feature we are supposed to be born with but it is the very fact of us eventually activating the 
faculty of understanding. That is, we build it, we strive to achieve it. It is not something we are born with but it 
depends on our engagement into a cognitive activity. It depends on our will, and especially on several different 
capacities we have, like for instance on our corporeal features, again. It is true, not all the humans can do that. For 
this purpose it would be useful to remind the Aristotelian notorious theory of slaves. Firs, humans that eventually 
refuse or avoid or by any other mean cannot manifest self-determination and will, make themselves dependent 
therefore possessions of another:  
“He who is by nature not his own but another’s man, is by nature a slave. (…) For he who can be, and therefore is, another’s, and he who 
participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have, is a slave by nature” (Politics, 1254a15, in Barnes, 1991).  
Second, a person who, by nature or any other cause, is more gifted for physical work, is also a slave by nature, 
for  
“Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labour, the other upright, and 
although useless for such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace”. (Politics, 1254a20-1254a23, in Barnes, 1991). 
Humans are gradually differentiated by the extent to which they can activate the intellectual capacity and this is 
also connected with the bodily peculiarities. That mind is strongly dependent on body comes clear from another 
Aristotelian context as well. In De Generatione animalium (736b13, 32-779a2) we read that foetus has a soul: 
“for the seeds and fetuses of animals are no less alive than plants, and are fertile up to a point. (…) but as they progress they have also the 
perceptive soul in virtue of which they are animal (…) for the end is the last to be produced, and the end of each animal’s generation is that which 
is peculiar to it”  (, in Barnes, 1991)  
J.L. Ackrill (1997: 175) used exact terms in his interpretation, saying straightforward that it is the body that has 
the properties which we usually call soul: 
“it would make sense to say of a human body that it might have failed to grow to maturity that it might have remained at the merely vegetable or 
merely animal stage. That a given body has this psuche (the human) is contingent if it might have failed to develop beyond the animal stage” 
According to this perspective, knowledge is an action of the body understood as a compound of form and matter: 
we say that knowledge and understanding comes into existence as an act of the body’s form. Mind is therefore what 
body does in an epistemic situation, namely, as body’s perception organs encounter another body and regard it as an 
object of knowledge. It is tempting, in this respect, to argue for the idea that human body is by nature regarding 
another body or object an epistemic way, since, as stated in the Metaphysics (980b26-981a12): “The animals other 
than man live by appearances and memories”. Sorabji (in Nussbaum & Oksenberg, 2003: 198) spoke about a 
propositional content of perception and put it in these words: 
“The propositional content of perception and appearance answers another problem. It has been thought that Aristotle oscillates wildly on the 
mental capacities he allows to animals. Having distinguishes animals from men as lacking reason in the De anima, he none the less allows the 
lion to entertain propositions about the ox he is going to eat in the Nicomachean Ethics. Moreover, there and in the biological works he allows 
animal emotions, which are elsewhere treated as involving belief (doxa) in past or future harm or benefit. I think it can now be seen that this 
suggested oscillation is apparent rather than real. Perception was all along treated in the On the Soul as admitting a propositional content.” 
If mind is in general equivalent to perception, memory, imagination and intellect, what is an animal mind then? 
Or, maybe, what do animals miss in order to have a mind? 
5. Animal mind 
Aristotle formulates an answer when he indicates the cause of movement as the appetite and imagination, which 
is either calculative or sensitive:  
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“These two at all events appear to be sources of movement: appetite and mind (if one may venture to regard imagination as a kind of thinking; 
for many men follow their imaginations contrary to knowledge, and in all animals other than man there is no thinking or calculation but only 
imagination). (1) mind, that is, which calculates means to an end, i.e. mind practical (it differs from mind speculative in the character of its end); 
while (2) appetite is in every form of it relative to an end: for that which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of mind practical; So too when 
imagination originates movement, it necessarily involves appetite. Inasmuch as an animal is capable of appetite it is capable of self-movement; it 
is not capable of appetite without possessing imagination; and all imagination is either (1) calculative or (2) sensitive. In the latter all animals, and 
not only man, partake.” (On the Soul, 3, 10, in Barnes, 1991)  
Animals are therefore capable of calculative and sensitive imagination. Without this, they would not have the 
internal power to move because they need to be able to represent the aim of their movement.  
Animal and man have common functions like perception, memory and sensitive imagination. But it is the 
intellect, practical and calculative they miss. First, animals are not able to calculate or have a purposive life. For 
instance: 
“And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just /and unjust, and the like” (Politics, 1253a8-1253a18, in 
Barnes, 1991) 
Still, they are gradually capable of social instinct (Politics 1253a), learning and being taught, some experience as 
well (Metaphysics, 80a28-980b27). The same passage in Metaphysics attributes phronesis to some animals. Their 
basic or specific faculty is perception.  
But in de Motu Animalium 7 animals are allowed reasoning (syllogizesthai) as they move and act by a not merely 
a combination of appetite and perception but a practical syllogism as well (Sorabji, 1995: 16). Here Aristotle says  
“For the actualizing of desire is a substitute for inquiry or thinking. I want to drink, says appetite; this is drink, says sense or imagination or 
thought: straightaway I drink. In this way living creatures are impelled to move and to act, and desire is the last cause of movement, and desire 
arises through perception or through imagination and thought” (Movement of animals, 701a 33-34, in Barnes, 1991). 
So animals act in a manner similar to reasoning. Sorabji (1995) notes that “if drawing the conclusion and 
drinking is simply a causal process, there seems to be nothing to stop an animal engaging in practical syllogism, or 
reasoning”. Phantasia seems to be the principal capacity Aristotle investigates in On the Souls 3.3. for this purpose. 
As Caston (1996: 54) concludes, phantasia is not a limited experience related with sensorial life but Aristotle’s 
specific account for animal behavior, associated with a considerable degree of intentionality. 
Nevertheless, as they have phantasia, are capable of taking external forms from the objects they perceive, and 
these two, perception and taking an external form, have sense only together, as the ability to separate sensible form 
of the perceived objects is the result of perception. 
6. A mind for plants 
Plants, on the contrary, do not move spatially and this is tightly linked to their inability to represent or imagine. 
“Mindless” as they seem to be, plants are able to guide us once more through the problem of animal mind. Aristotle 
says that plants have nutrition and growth, therefore some form of internal movement. 
“Living, that is, may mean thinking or perception or local movement and rest, or movement in the sense of nutrition, decay and growth. Hence 
we think of plants also as living, for they are observed to possess in themselves an originative power through which they increase or decrease (De 
anima, 2.2, in Barnes, 1991) 
On this account, the nutritive soul of the plants is considered as separable from the other powers, while the others 
depend on it (On the Soul, 413b5-7). This is why plants can have mere nutritive capacity on its own as separate but 
at the same times the lowest complexity of the soul (Polanski: 2007, 169). Still, even if plants posses a form of soul, 
therefore autonomous movement, they cannot imagine and perceive. This means that plants’ soul is not capable to 
take the form of external objects without its sensitive matter. In other words, the soul of plants is affected by form 
and matter together, without separation.  
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“In spite of their having a portion of soul in them and obviously being affected by tangible objects themselves (…) they have no mean [424b] of 
contrary qualities, and so no principle in them capable of taking on the forms of sensible objects without their matter; in the case of plants the 
affection is an affection by form-and-matter together.” (On the Soul, 2.12, 424a32-424b3, in Barnes, 1991) 
Two things are important in this passage as causal explanations for plants not being capable of perception: a) that 
plants have no mean, and b) there is no principle in them capable of being affected by the forms of sensible objects 
without their matter. 
The mean (mesoteta) mentioned here reminds of the similar remark in the book V of On the Soul III, where 
Aristotle speaks of the light as a mean or intermediary for visual perception. Just as there is a mean for perception, 
so it is for the intellect, which must rely on an intermediary principle for understanding as suggested in On the Soul 
III.5 where Aristotle compares intellectual activity with perception and says that just as there is the light as an 
intermediary for sight so it should be something similar for the intellect: 
“And in fact thought, as we have described it, is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of 
making all things:this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours” (On the Soul 430a14-
430a16 , in Barnes, 1991). 
It is this intermediary that plants perception lacks, which means they are only affected in a mechanical way by 
the encountered objects, not in a cognitive way. To understand this passage we favor the point made by Themistius 
(4th cent. A.D.) that plants are affected by the form and matter of aistheta combined together (Panagiotou, 1975: 47). 
Evidently there is an important gap between plants and animals concerning soul: this is exactly the capacity of 
understanding, in terms of acquiring sensible forms from the outer world. In this sense there is surely a form of 
understanding for animals. The fundamental problem is whether there is a concept of mind to be acceptable as 
common to human and animals. 
7. Animal and human minds as analogous 
Aristotle’s denial of reason (logos) and belief (doxa) for animals is compensated by a rich perceptive content in a 
predicative relation with the object; they act as if, Aristotle says, they had technical knowledge (technikos) and 
dianoia, as stated in History of Animals 615a, 616a, 620b, 622b, respectively 6612b, 616b and 610b, or even noeros 
in On the Parts of Animals 648a. In general Aristotle ascribes animals with traces or likeness (homoiotetes) of 
human understanding, some in degrees and some in a more remote analogy (Sorabji, 1995: 12-14). A precious detail 
in the History of Animals, directed to by Sorabji in the same text, says that  
“As technical skill (techne), expertise (sophia) and understanding (sunesis) are to man, so there is some different (hetera) natura capacity of the 
kind in some of the animals” (588a30-31, in Barnes, 1991) 
Is simply means that there could be other capacities that count for animals as mind (tameness and wildness, 
docility and stubbornness, boldness and cowardice, fear, confidence, anger, mischief and other analogues of 
intellectual understanding) to the same extent that technical skill, expertise and understanding count as mind to 
humans. A similar passage in the opening of History of Animals 9.1 asserts the same thing: 
“Of the animals that are comparatively obscure and short-lived the characters are not so obvious to our perception as are those of animals that are 
longer-lived. These latter animals appear to have a natural capacity corresponding to each of the passions of the soul: to good sense or simplicity, 
courage or timidity, to good temper or to bad, and to other similar dispositions” 
It is the sum of activities that the living being is able to do that constitutes its mind or, if one prefers to say so, the 
self of that being. An animal mind is therefore whatever perceptive interactions we can name pertaining to an 
individual, but this mind is not to be taken as separate. The mind is always a the specific kind of relation a living 
individual is able to establish with another individual. Aristotle’s view is that it is the human (anthropos) who is 
angry, or pities, or knows, in virtue of having a soul, not the soul as such. Accordingly, a friend is therefore “another 
self” (allos or heteros autos), mainly because the two friends are parts of a relation they can build (see Sorabji, 
2008: 18). 
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To sum up, an animal mind is able to perceive (this means assuming an external sensible form), memorize and 
represent, use sounds and signs (On the Soul 420b32, Politics 1253a 10-14), and (seemingly) of practical reasoning. 
8. Conclusion 
It was not necessarily Aristotle’s denial of animal mind that lead to centuries of extreme similar positions, like 
Lurz said, and it was not necessarily just a matter of arguing against Aristotle’s position that led from Theophrastus 
to John Locke; rather, Aristotle’s position is open to both sides which only means that there is a concept of animal 
mind in Aristotle. It can be described by three main features: a) one that is common to humans, that is, assuming 
sensible forms of observed objects; b) practical reasoning or some form of deciding towards actions; c) dispositions 
like simplicity, courage, temper and so on, pointed by analogy. 
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